The objective of this presentation is to provide an understanding of the biological threats facing the international community to be better informed to provide biological security (biosecurity) to the respective populations. Biosecurity may be defined as the state wherein people, animals, and plants, as well as the environment in which they live, are protected against dangers arising from the emergence of epidemics and epizootics of natural or laboratory etiology.
This presentation will discuss the limited concerted effort by intergovernmental agencies to meet the threat of biological threats of natural etiology by monitoring the incidence and spread of a few reportable diseases. A particularly threatening disease may at times become the target for concerted international action, such as the global response to severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS), but so far this has been the exception. Usually once the biological threat has materialized (i.e., the disease is apparent and spreading), the responsibility for its management is assigned to national public health agencies, who use control methods based on epidemiology, preventive medicine, hygiene and sanitation, and quarantine. Given that infectious diseases do not respect political boundaries, a response that depends almost solely on the actions of local and national authorities could be substantially improved upon.
Research and development may engender biological threats by accident or design. A laboratory accident may release an agent under investigation into nature, where it could have incalculable effects on humans or the environment. Similarly, the field-testing of microorganisms designed for specific purposes may lead to those organisms spreading beyond the test site, again with incalculable effects. Currently, governments seek to reduce the level of hazard associated with research and testing by imposing strict regulations that dictate the parameters under which risky activities may be carried out. Because microorganisms are not contained by political borders, an international effort to control hazardous bioscientific activities is necessary.
Biological threats are, in effect, biological weapons. Society seeks to meet the threat of biological warfare through the 1972 Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC). The BWC State Parties extend the strictures spelled out in the Convention to their citizens through the adoption of implementing national legislation. However, as this presentation will discuss, the BWC's shortcomings limit its ability to prevent the proliferation of biological weapons. In particular, it lacks provisions for verification; i.e., State Parties are severely handicapped in their ability to verify whether a country indeed is complying with the treaty. The need for a stronger international biological arms control regime is apparent.
No international law is likely to prevent terrorists from acquiring and deploying biological weapons. Therefore, society may first learn of the existence of an illicit terrorist biological warfare program when its goals are met; i.e., when a biological weapon strikes a human, animal, or plant population. This presentation will briefly discuss how society might act to diminish the threat of terrorists acquiring biological weapons, though it should be clearly understood that whatever might be done will likely be ineffective. In the scenario, an explosion by a terrorist at a race course disseminated a toxic chemical into the crowd. To ensure as realistic an event as possible, there was no predeployment of emergency crews or materials, and hospital staff were not informed of the details of the event. A significant number of "victims" presented to the hospital under their own initiative, prior to decontamination. A total of 170 "smart casualties" were used in the event, and the largest fixed decontamination system in Australia was tested for the first time.
Despite months of planning, and an attempt at anticipating all potential outcomes, a number of unexpected problems in the management of multiple contaminated casualties developed. Footage of the exercise will be shown, and details of the many lessons learned will be presented.
